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Why  Have Short-Term 
Interest  Rates 
Been So High? 
THE most visible and persistent feature of the U.S. financial  markets 
thus  far  during  the 1980s  has been high  interest  rates. Observed  nominal 
interest  rates on most instruments  traded  in the U.S. debt markets  have 
set record highs twice since 1980. Perhaps more important, "real" 
interest rates, in the sense of observed nominal  rates less a presumed 
expectation  of future  price inflation,  have been unprecedentedly  high  as 
well. During  the past few years nominal  interest  rates  first  rose to levels 
far above the prevailing  inflation  rate, and more recently  the decline in 
nominal  interest rates has lagged well behind the slackening  pace of 
inflation.  Especially for instruments  of short maturity,  for which infer- 
ences about expectations of  inflation in the distant future are not 
necessary, these high nominal  interest  rates have clearly  corresponded 
to high  real  rates as well. 
Although the rough dimensions of this development are broadly 
familiar,  it may be helpful  to recall  just how sizable these interest rate 
movements have been. The three-month  U.S.  Treasury  bill rate, for 
example, was  11.60 percent on average during the fifteen calendar 
quarters  beginning  in 1979:4  (when the Federal Reserve System an- 
nounced  its new monetary  policy)  and  extending  through  mid-year  1983. 
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During  the immediately  preceding  fifteen quarters  the average three- 
month  bill  rate  was only 6.55 percent.  Not a single  quarter's  value  during 
the more recent period  was as low as the mean  for the previous  period, 
and  not a single quarter's  value from  the previous  period  was as high as 
the more recent mean. The analogous  contrast  with still earlier  periods 
is even greater.  The three-month  bill rate averaged  6.12 percent  during 
the 1970s  (except for 1979:4),  and  averaged  3.45 percent  from  the end of 
the Korean  War  through  the 1960s.  Long-term  interest  rates  have shown 
roughly  similar  patterns. 
Comparisons  with  the corresponding  implied  real  interest  rates  show, 
if anything, even sharper  contrasts. On the basis of price inflation  as 
measured by the change in the GNP deflator, the real three-month 
Treasury  bill  rate  was 4.60 percent  on average  during  1979:4-1983:2,  but 
slightly negative, at  -0.3  percent, on average during 1976:1-1979:3. 
Given the state of and prospects for the U.S.  economy since 1980, 
market  participants  probably anticipated  at least part of the cyclical 
slowing, and then the continuing  slower rate, of inflation.  Hence this 
change from a negative to a sharply  positive implied  real interest rate 
probably  corresponds,  at least roughly,  to a'  rise in the unobservable  real 
short-term  interest rate perceived by market  participants.  Analogous 
calculations  for long-term  interest  rates show a similar  steep rise in the 
implied  real rate; what inflation  rate is appropriate  in this case is less 
clear, however, so that  inferences  about  the relevant  real  long-term  rate 
are  less reliable. 
The persistence of such pervasively high interest rate levels in the 
United States has not merely attracted  attention  as a financial  phenom- 
enon notable in its own right, but has also created concerns about its 
likely consequences for nonfinancial  economic activity. The most fre- 
quently  expressed concern has been that high interest rates, including 
especially high real rates, will so discourage  overall economic activity 
as to cause the business recovery  that  began  in late 1982  to "abort"  well 
before the economy returns to full utilization  of its labor and capital 
resources.  No doubt  a  prominent  source  of this  concern  is the  recollection 
of the role that high interest rates played in making  the twelve-month 
recovery  from  the 1980  recession  the shortest  U.S. business  recovery  in 
six decades. An additional  worry,  equally  or  even more  important  for  the 
economy's longer-run  prospects, is that high interest rate levels will 
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capital,  leaving an expansion  largely  dominated  by consumer  and gov- 
ernment  military  spending. 
The objective of this paper is to gain some understanding  of the 
prevailing  high level of U.S.  short-term  interest rates by framing  and 
attempting  to answer  two questions:  Have short-term  interest  rates  been 
"too high"-that  is, higher  than would have been expected given the 
relevant  historical  relations  between  interest  rates  and  other  key aspects 
of macroeconomic  activity?  If so, why? In other  words, is it possible to 
explain  whatever  has been unusual  about the recent behavior  of short- 
term interest rates in terms of familiar  macroeconomic  concepts like 
aggregate  demand,  aggregate  supply,  demand  for money, and so on? 
The basic framework  for addressing  questions  like these must there- 
fore be some representation  of the relevant  historical  relations. Useful 
representations  for this purpose  may be simple  or complicated  and  may 
range from unrestricted  correlations to highly detailed models with 
elaborate  structural  restrictions.  The strategy  in this paper  is to forecast 
short-term  interest rates using a small "structural"  macroeconometric 
model developed and estimated through 1976:2  in a previous BPEA 
paper by Friedman, and then to examine the model's forecasts and 
forecast  errors.  1,2 
The analysis first  focuses on the model's average  short-term  interest 
rate  forecasts  and  forecast  errors  during  1976:3-1979:3,  and  again  during 
1979:4-1983:2.  This comparison  between the recent behavior  of short- 
term  interest  rates and the model's postsample  forecasts sheds light  on 
whether rates have been "too high" given the historical  correlations 
summarized  by the model. A decomposition of the model's forecast 
errors  into respective elements due to the disturbance  terms  associated 
with individual  structural  equations  then leads to conclusions  about  the 
relative  contributions  of various sources of the high short-term  interest 
rates  prevailing  in the more  recent  period. 
Any such analysis depends, of course, on the assumption  that the 
model's slope parameters  have remained  unchanged  during  the post- 
1. Benjamin  M. Friedman,  "The Inefficiency  of Short-Run  Monetary  Targets  for 
Monetary Policy,"  BPEA, 2:1977, pp. 293-335. 
2. In another  paper  the authors  take the opposite approach,  using an unrestricted 
vector autoregression  to summarize  the relevant  historical  correlations.  See Richard  H. 
Clarida  and Benjamin  M. Friedman,  "The Behavior  of U.S. Short-Term  Interest  Rates 
since October  1979:  A Statistical  Analysis" (Harvard  University, 1983).  The results of 
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sample  forecast  period  under  examination.  This  assumption  is especially 
important  for the error  decompositions  underlying  the paper's conclu- 
sions about  the reasons  for the observed  high  level of short-term  interest 
rates.  The analysis  compares  the actual  path  of short-term  interest  rates 
to the path that would have been consistent with historical  relations  if 
they had remained  as they were in the past. By contrast,  an announced 
and  credible  change of policy regime  like that instituted  by the Federal 
Reserve System in October 1979  can change any or all parameters  of a 
model  like the one employed  here. If such a break  did  in fact occur-and 
there  is evidence that one did-it  would then not be possible to recover 
the structural  disturbances  from  the corresponding  forecast  errors  using 
the model's historically  estimated  coefficients. The importance  of this 
argument  is an empirical  issue, and in the final  section of the paper  we 
present evidence bearing  on it in the context of the exercise reported 
here. 
The analysis  reveals that  short-term  interest  rates  since October  1979 
have been "too high" in the sense discussed  above and  that  the familiar 
story of relatively little money for the prevailing  levels of economic 
activity  (in  particular,  the slow growth  of real  money  balances  due to the 
combination of slow growth of nominal money supply and sluggish 
deceleration  of price inflation)  goes a long way toward  explaining  why 
this has been so. In contrast to earlier  postsample  periods, the model 
substantially  underpredicts  short-term  interest  rates on average  during 
1979:4-1983:2.  Decomposition  of the model's  forecast  errors  shows that 
unexpectedly slow growth in money supply and unexpectedly rapid 
price  inflation  are  the largest  factors  accounting  for  this  underprediction. 
The evidence indicating  a shift  in the model's slope parameters  warrants 
caution in interpreting  the latter results, however; such results are 
perhaps more suggestive as an aid to intuition  than they are directly 
descriptive. 
The Model and Its Interest Rate Forecasts 
Friedman's  earlier  model includes empirical  estimates for relations 
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supply, the term structure of interest rates, and a nominal income 
identity.3  The model was estimated  by Fair's method  for simultaneous 
equations  with lagged dependent  variables  and serially  correlated  dis- 
turbances,  using  quarterly  U.S. data  spanning  1961:  1-1976:2.4  Friedman 
called  this six-equation  model  the Pirandello  model. 
The revised equations of the model and empirical  estimates for the 
1961:1-1976:2  sample  period  are as follows.5 
Aggregate  demand: 
(1)  AXt =  0.0057  -  0.1082 A?rLt +  0. 1274 AEt 
(4.2)  (-  2.9)  (2.5) 
-  0.0611 AIt-1 +  0.4839  AXt- 
(1-.9)  (5.4) 
R2 = 0.58, standard  error  = 0.00767,  rho =  -0.4; 
Aggregate  supply: 
(2)  APt =  0.0929 AXt-I  +  0.0626 AIt- I +  0.8371 APt_ 
(3.6)  (4.5)  (22.9) 
R  =  0.89, standard  error  = 0.00336,  rho =  -0.1; 
Money demand: 
(3)  zX(M  -  P)t  =  0.0970 AXt -  0.0437 Arst +  0.9583 zX(M  -  P)t_ 
(1.4)  (-3.8)  (7.5) 
R  =  0.57, standard  error  = 0.00725,  rho =  -0.6; 
3. Friedman,  "The Inefficiency  of Short-Run  Monetary  Targets."  For a comparative 
analysis  of the original  model's performance,  see Kevin Maloney,  Lawrence  H. Meyer, 
and Michael  Smirlock, "A Comparison  of Small Income Expenditure  and Monetarist 
Econometric  Models," in Lawrence H. Meyer, ed., A Comparison  of the Predictive 
Performance of Small Macroeconometric  Models,  vol.  2, Working Paper Series (Wash- 
ington  University,  Department  of Economics, 1983),  pp. 1-26. 
4. Ray C. Fair, "The Estimation  of Simultaneous  Equation  Models with Lagged 
Endogenous  Variables  and First Order  Serially  Correlated  Errors,"  Econometrica,  vol. 
38  (May  1970),  pp. 507-16. Because  of problems  encountered  in  the  estimation,  the  money 
supply  equation  was estimated  by ordinary  least squares  in the original  model. 
5. All variables  are in logarithms.  Predetermined  variables  are E, I, L, R, rD, and S. 
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Money supply: 
(4)  AM, =  0.0037 +  0.2513 ARt +  0.0182  Arst 
(2.5)  (2.4)  (1.2) 
-0.0348  ArDt  +  0.6879 AMt- 
(-1.9)  (6.9) 
K2  = 0.48, standarderror  = 0.00475,  rho =  -0.2; 
Term structure of interest rates: 
(5)  rLt =  0.0334  +  0.1145 rst -  0.0320 rs.,- 
(0.8)  (0.7)  (-0.2) 
+  0.1319 A(L -  S),  I +  0.9215 rL, 
(2.0)  (37.7) 
W2  = 0.99, standard  error  = 0.021, rho = 0.4; 
Nominal income identity: 
(6)  A  Y, = AXt  + Apt, 
where 
E =  high-employment  federal  expenditures 
I=  import price deflator 
L =  outstanding  long-term  federal  debt 
M  =  money stock (MI) 
P  =  GNP price deflator 
R  =  stock of nonborrowed reserves 
rD  =  discount rate 
rL  =  Baa corporate  bond  rate 
rs =  three-month Treasury bill rate 
S =  outstanding  short-term  federal  debt 
X  =  real GNP 
Y =  nominal GNP. 
Apart from revisions in the data, these estimates differ  from those 
presented in the previous BPEA paper in two ways. First, while the 
money demand equation retains the original specification, money is 
defined  here as the narrow  MI money stock. (It was M2 in the original Richard H.  Clarida and Benjamin M. Friedman  559 
version.)6 Second, this change in the definition  of the money stock 
variable  requires  a slightly  different  specification  of the money supply 
equation, involving the introduction  of an intercept and the discount 
rate.7  In all other  respects, the model's definitions  and  specifications  are 
exactly the same as in the original. 
There is no point in repeating  here the detailed discussion of each 
equation  presented  with  the original  estimates  in Friedman's  1977  paper, 
but a few summary  comments may be helpful. The aggregate  demand 
equation  includes an interest rate, or IS curve, effect (here based on a 
nominal  long-term  interest rate), a fiscal policy effect, and a terms-of- 
trade  effect.8  The aggregate  supply  equation  relates  price setting  to real 
economic activity and also to the terms of trade. The money demand 
equation has the standard  real LM curve specification. The money 
supply  equation  combines  a nonborrowed  reserves  multiplier  effect with 
a borrowed  reserves response associated with the discount  rate and an 
excess reserves  response  associated  with  the short-term  market  interest 
rate. The term structure  equation, which provides a link between the 
long-term  interest  rate in the aggregate  demand  equation  and the short- 
term interest rate in the money demand  and money supply equations, 
combines a form of the standard  expectations hypothesis with a debt- 
management  policy effect.9  The nominal  income identity  is straightfor- 
ward. 
For convenience, all equations  of the model  are assumed  to be linear 
in  logarithms,  and  no variable  is lagged  more  than  once. Hence the model 
is a simple  linear  first-order  difference  equation  system. As applied  here, 
the model  determines  six variables:  the growth  rates  of real  and  nominal 
income, prices and the money stock, and short-  and long-term  interest 
rates. Exogenous variables  include  fiscal  policy (high-employment  gov- 
6. At that  time  it appeared  that  the Federal  Reserve  System  was moving  toward  an  M2 
orientation  for monetary  policy. Subsequent  experience showed the primacy  of MI, 
however. 
7.  In addition,  the money supply  equation  is estimated  here  using  Fair's  method;  see 
note 4. The inclusion  of the discount  rate  may  make  it appear  to be too easy for the model 
to forecast interest rates, but the steady-state  coefficient  relating  the logarithm  of the 
discount  rate  to the logarithm  of the Treasury  bill  rate  is only 0.06. 
8.  See the text below for a discussion  of real  interest  rates  in the IS curve  and  for an 
estimated  example. 
9. In the reestimated  term-structure  equation  the coefficients  on the two short-term 
interest  rate  terms  are no longer  significant  individually  but are highly  significant  jointly; 
the  F-statistic  for a test of the null  hypothesis  that  both  coefficients  are  zero is 21.26. 560  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
ernment  expenditures),  monetary  policy (nonborrowed  reserves  and  the 
discount rate), debt-management  policy (the maturity  of outstanding 
government  debt), and the dollar price of imports.  The model's com- 
pactness and simplicity  result  from the imposition  of many  restrictions 
on the data. The advantage  of such restrictions  is not  just convenience 
but the ease with which it is possible to carry out analytical  exercises 
such as the ones reported  below. 
The top panel of  table 1 shows the model's quarter-by-quarter 
performance  in forecasting short-term  interest rates from 1976:3 to 
1979:3-the first  thirteen  quarters  beyond the end of the sample  period. 
These forecasts are based on a dynamic  simulation  in which, after the 
first postsample quarter, the forecast of each variable relies on the 
model's forecast of all endogenous variables in the previous period. 
Although  the short-term  interest  rate  variable  generated  by the model  is 
a logarithm,  for  convenience  the  table  reports  values  converted  to natural 
units stated in percentage  points. 
The model  correctly  forecasts  the general  upward  trend  of short-term 
interest  rates during  this thirteen-quarter  period,  though  hardly  without 
errors.  The forecast error  has a mean  of 0.30 percentage  point-that  is, 
a small overprediction-and a root mean square of 0.70 point. For a 
thirteen-quarter  beyond-sample dynamic forecast, with a model de- 
signed with compactness and simplicity  as top priorities, this perfor- 
mance  is far  from  poor. More specifically,  it suggests  that  the structural 
restrictions  that the model places on the historical  correlations  among 
the included variables  represent  an efficient summary  of the data and 
also capture  the essential features of the correlations  among  variables 
relevant  for forecasting. 
The bottom panel of the table shows an analogous account of the 
model's performance  for 1979:4-1983:2,  based on a reestimation  of the 
model using 1961:1-1979:3  data. An appendix  to this paper  shows the 
reestimated  equations.  As above, the forecasts are based on a dynamic 
simulation relying, except for the first quarter, on the model's own 
forecast of all endogenous variables.  The results of Chow tests do not 
indicate evidence of a break after 1976:2  for any of the model's five 
estimated equations, so that in principle there is no need to use a 
reestimated  model for the second forecast period.10  Nevertheless, the 
two sets of forecasts and  forecast errors  are more  directly  comparable  if 
10. The  F-statistics  are reported  in the first  column  of table  5 below. Richard H.  Clarida and Benjamin M. Friedman  561 
Table 1.  Short-Term Interest Rate Forecasts and Forecast Errors, 
1976:3 through 1983:2 
Percent 
Quarter  and 
mean  Forecast  Actual  Error 
1976:3  5.39  5.17  0.22 
4  5.46  4.70  0.76 
1977:1  5.58  4.62  0.96 
2  6.11  4.83  1.28 
3  6.36  5.47  0.89 
4  6.79  6.14  0.65 
1978:1  6.87  6.41  0.46 
2  7.11  6.48  0.63 
3  7.55  7.32  0.24 
4  8.41  8.68  -  0.27 
1979:1  8.62  9.36  -  0.74 
2  8.80  9.37  -  0.58 
3  9.06  9.63  -  0.58 
Mean  7.08  6.78  0.30 
1979:4  10.68  11.80  -  1.12 
1980:1  12.21  13.46  -  1.25 
2  11.61  10.05  1.56 
3  11.04  9.23  1.81 
4  11.65  13.71  -2.06 
1981:1  11.97  14.37  -  2.40 
2  12.88  14.83  -  1.95 
3  12.47  15.09  -  2.62 
4  11.41  12.02  -  0.61 
1982:1  11.48  12.90  -  1.41 
2  11.46  12.36  -  0.90 
3  10.46  9.71  0.76 
4  9.95  7.94  2.01 
1983:1  6.95  8.08  -  1.13 
2  6.95  8.42  -  1.47 
Mean  10.88  11.60  -  0.72 
Sources:  The top panel is from text  equations  I through 6 estimated  over  1961:1-1976:2;  the bottom panel, from 
the same equations estimated  over  1961:1-1979:3  and shown in the appendix.  Data are from the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve  System. 
each refers  to a sequence of quarters  immediately  following  the sample 
period  of the model used to generate  it. II 
Asjudged  solely by the  forecast  mean,  the  model  does a fairly  adequate 
job of forecasting  the average  upward  shift  in the short-term  interest  rate 
11. In any case, the choice of the equations  shown in the text versus those in the 
appendix  does not matter  much for the interest rate forecast results shown here. An 
analogous  simulation  for 1979:4-1983:2, based on the model estimated only through 
1976:2,  generated  mean forecasts for the Treasury  bill rate of 10.91  percent. Even the 
quarter-by-quarter  patterns  of the two sets of interest  rate  forecasts  were closely similar. 562  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1983 
in this second postsample  period. In contrast  to the 0.30 percent mean 
overprediction  of the bill rate in the earlier  period, the mean forecast 
error  in the more recent period is - 0.72 percent, an underprediction. 
This underprediction  is small, however, in comparison  with the large 
change in the average level of the bill rate between the two periods. 
Hence the model, with its conventional  determination  of the short-term 
interest  rate  by the equation  of money supply  and money demand,  also 
performs  fairly well in forecasting  the sharply  higher  mean  level of the 
Treasury  bill rate in the more recent period. Taken  at face value, these 
results  suggest  that, on average,  short-term  interest  rates since October 
1979  have been not very much higher  than  would have been consistent 
with previous  historical  relations,  given the policy and nonpolicy  deter- 
minants  of nonfinancial  economic activity  and  hence money  demand,  as 
well as money supply, as summarized  in the model. 
Closer examination  reveals reasons for rejecting  this initial impres- 
sion, however. An inspection of the underlying quarter-by-quarter 
pattern indicates that this relatively successful prediction of the bill 
rate's mean over the more recent fifteen-quarter  forecast period  masks 
some  large  errors.  The  model  underpredicts  the  rate  in  all  quarters  except 
1980:2-1980:3,  when formal  credit  controls  were in effect, and 1982:3- 
1982:4,  when the rate suddenly  plummeted  to a level that soon proved 
transitory.  The mean forecast error  for the remaining  eleven quarters 
is -  1.54 percentage  points. Although  the actual Treasury  bill rate ex- 
ceeded 13  percent  in five of these quarters  and 15  percent  in 1981:3,  the 
model's  peak  forecast  is only 12.88  percent.  The root mean  square  error 
for 1979:4-1983:2  is 1.64 percentage  points, more  than  double  the 0.70 
point  for 1976:3-1979:3. 
More important,  simply obtaining  a correct answer (here, a nearly 
correct  answer)  is not the end of the story. It is also important  to be right 
for the right  reasons. Decomposition  of the forecast errors  reported  in 
table 1 to trace these errors to disturbances  in the model's structural 
equations  shows that the model for 1976:3-1979:3  is right  for approxi- 
mately  the right  reasons. The model's  performance  in forecasting  short- 
term  interest  rates since October  1979,  however, turns  out to be (nearly) 
right  for the wrong  reasons. 
Decomposition  of the Forecast Errors 
Given  the historically  estimated  coefficients  of a linear  model  like that 
shown in equations 1 through  6, it is straightforward  to recover the Richard H.  Clarida and Benjamin M. Friedman  563 
contribution  made by each equation's structural  disturbance  toward 
explaining  the errors in forecasting each of the model's endogenous 
variables. If vi, is the dynamic forecast error for the ith endogenous 
variable  in period t, and uj, is the additive  structural  disturbance  to the 
jth equation  in period  s, then equations 1 through  6 imply  the system of 
linear  difference  equations, 
Vlt  =  Ult  +  I13V1,t-  1  +  r12V5t, 
V2t  U2t  +  r22V1,t-1  +  r23V2,t-1, 
r334V3t  - U3t-  32V1  -  V2t  +  r333V4t  +  V4t -  333V4,t-1, 
V4t  U4t +  r343V4,t-  1  +  r342V3t, 
V5t =  U5t +  r352V3t  +  r353V3,t-  1  +  r354V5,t-1 
V6t  Vlt  +  V2t, 
where the 3 values are the estimated  coefficients shown in equations 1 
through  5. Since the vit  are known  (and  in particular  are identically  zero 
before 1976:2 or 1979:3 in the two simulations, respectively), it is 
possible to solve this system of equations recursively to recover the 
sequence of structural  disturbances  corresponding  to each of the five 
estimated equations. The structural  model is  dynamic, so  that the 
forecast errors, vit,  are in general  linear  functions  of current  as well as 
past structural  disturbances,  uj1. 
Although  the model  is estimated  in first  differences,  it is also straight- 
forward  to recover the contribution  made  by each equation's  structural 
disturbances  toward  explaining  the errors  in forecasting  the log level of 
the short-term  interest  rate  (or any of the model's other  five endogenous 
variables).  The identity, 
ln rst =  In rsJt- I +  A In rst, 
implies 
t  t 
ln  rst -  ln  Pst =  >  /  AIn rs  -  A  In  ST  =  E  V3,, 
T =  1976:2  T  =  1976:2 
where the circumflex  indicates a forecast value. In other words, the 
forecast error  of the log level of the short-term  rate equals the sum of 
past forecast  errors  of the difference  of the log of the short-term  rate. 
This procedure  exactly decomposes the log error  in forecasting  each 
interest rate level  into contributions representing the model's five 
structural  disturbances.  However, it is convenient  to think  about  interest 564  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1983 
rates  in natural  units  rather  than  in logarithms.  Because the log operator 
is nonlinear,  the decomposition  of the log errors  does not correspond 
exactly to a decomposition  of the natural-unit  errors. The discussion 
proceeds as if the correspondence  were exact, so that a disturbance 
contributing,  say, Z percent of the log error is likewise assumed to 
contribute  Z percent  of the error  stated  in natural  units. 
In general, positive disturbances to aggregate demand, ul, price 
setting, u2, and money demand, U3,  all cause underpredictions  of the 
short-term  interest rate, while positive disturbances  to money supply, 
U4,  and the yield-spread  relation, U5,  both cause overpredictions.  The 
signs  of these effects are  easy to explain  in terms  of the determination  of 
the short-term  rate in the equations expressing money demand and 
money supply. Because of the dependence of the demand for real 
balances  on real economic activity, a positive disturbance  to aggregate 
demand  or to the money demand  function itself increases the demand 
for real balances, and hence nominal money demand given prices. 
Similarly,  a positive disturbance  to prices raises money demand  given 
the factors determining  the demand  for real  balances. A positive distur- 
bance to the nominal  money supply has the reverse effect. Finally, a 
positive disturbance  to the yield-spread  relation  reduces  the demand  for 
money by diminishing  aggregate  demand  through  the effect of the long- 
term  interest  rate in the IS curve. 
Table 2 presents the results of applying  the method  described  above 
to decompose the short-term  interest  rate  forecast  errors  shown  in table 
1 into components representing  the separate  contributions  of the dis- 
turbances to the model's structural  equations. As the discussion has 
already  noted, the model's mean errors  in forecasting  the Treasury  bill 
rate  for 1976:3-1979:3  and 1979:4-1983:2  are  0.30 percentage  point  and 
- 0.72 point, respectively. The two columns  of the table show a decom- 
position  of these mean  forecast  errors  into  five  components,  correspond- 
ing to the model's five stochastic  relations. 
For 1976:3-1979:3  the dominant  source of the small mean overpre- 
diction  was a positive disturbance  to money supply  growth  that  lowered 
the actual  bill rate (but not the predicted  rate)  by 0.61 percentage  point 
on average. A negative disturbance  to the growth of money demand 
added  another  0.21 point  to this average  error,  but  a positive  disturbance 
to price inflation  simultaneously  offset -0.51  point of it. The distur- 
bances to the growth of aggregate demand and to the yield-spread 
relation  were both trivially  small  on average  during  this  period.  The 0.30 Richard H.  Clarida and Benjamin M. Friedman  565 
Table 2.  Decomposition of Short-Term Interest Rate Forecast Errors, 1976:3-1983:2a 
Percent 
Error  and  Mean,  Mean, 
decomposition  1976:3-1979:3  1979:4-1983:2 
Forecast  7.08  10.88 
Actual  6.78  11.60 
Error  source  0.30  -0.72 
Aggregate  demand  -0.05  0.63 
Aggregate  supply  -0.51  - 3.98 
Money demand  0.21  0.14 
Money supply  0.61  - 2.69 
Term structure  0.03  5.17 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
a.  Totals may not add because  of rounding. 
percentage  point  average  overprediction  during  1976:3-1979:3  therefore 
resulted  in part  from some offsetting  of structural  disturbances,  but the 
chief implication  of this decomposition is that all disturbances  were 
small (in absolute value) on average. In short, the forecast for 1979:3 
through  1976:3  was right  for the right  reason. 
By contrast,  the - 0.72 percentage  point  mean  underprediction  of the 
bill rate for 1979:4-1983:2  was much  more  the result  of large  structural 
disturbances  offsetting  one another.  The main  factors  at work  here  were 
an average positive disturbance  to price inflation  and a large average 
negative  disturbance  to money supply  growth,  which  raised  the bill rate 
by 3.98 points and 2.69 points, respectively. Largely offsetting these 
effects was a large average positive disturbance  to the yield-spread 
relation,  which lowered  the bill rate  by 5.17 points. 
Elements in the Decomposition 
The model's average  forecast of the short-term  interest  rate for the 
period  since October 1979  contains a large  element of being right  (or at 
least  not dramatically  wrong)  for the wrong  reason.  Three  phenomena- 
an average  positive disturbance  to price inflation,  an average  negative 
disturbance  to money supply growth, and an average positive distur- 
bance to the yield spread-came  close to offsetting  one another. Each 
of these three  large  average  disturbances  merits  separate  consideration. 
First, the average positive disturbance  to the price-setting  relation 
indicates  that since October 1979  price inflation  has decelerated  even 566  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
more sluggishly than would have been consistent with the relevant 
historical  experience.'2  Because of the simple specification  of the price 
(aggregate  supply) equation as shown in table 1, the only elements of 
that historical  experience that matter  in this context are real economic 
activity, the terms of trade, and the force of inertia  as represented  by 
past inflation  rates. A positive disturbance  on average during  1979:4- 
1983:2  therefore  means  that, given the actual  magnitude  of the 1980  and 
1981-82 business recessions and the appreciation  of the dollar's inter- 
national  exchange  rate during  this period  (and  given the actual  inflation 
rate in 1979:3),  a replication  of historical  experience  would have called 
for a greater  slowing  of inflation  than  actually  occurred.  Because prices 
continued to rise more rapidly than predicted, however, so too did 
nominal  money  demand.  Given  the growth  of the nominal  money  supply, 
short-term  interest  rates  were accordingly  higher. 
The finding  that inflation  since October 1979 slowed less than the 
model  predicted  has  implications  that  go well  beyond  the specific  context 
of this paper. Much of the debate about the effectiveness of monetary 
policy in recent years has focused precisely on the question  of whether 
previous historical experience would be adequate  to characterize  the 
response of price inflation  following  an announced  change  in monetary 
policy regime like that implemented  in October 1979. The claim in 
question,  however, has been that  prices  would  respond  to an announced 
and  implemented  slowing  of money  growth  by decelerating  more  quickly 
than  the previous  experience  implied.  Such a claim  would  be important, 
if true, because then slower growth of the nominal  money stock need 
not imply  so much  (in the extreme, any) slower  growth  of real  balances, 
and  hence need not imply  so much  (any)  slower  growth  of real  economic 
activity. In short, if it had been more rapid  than historical  experience 
predicted,  disinflation  would have been less costly than  that  experience 
suggested.  13 
12. This result  is parallel  to Perry's  finding,  presented  in another  paper  in this issue, 
that  the change  in policy did not produce  unexpectedly  quick  disinflation;  see George  L. 
Perry's  paper  in this issue, "What  Have We Learned  about  Disinflation?" 
13. For  a discussion  ofthese issues, see Benjamin  M. Friedman,  "Recent  Perspectives 
in and on Macroeconomics,"  Working  Paper 1208  (National  Bureau  of Economic Re- 
search, 1983).  In some more  recent  forms  of this argument,  a coordinated  fiscal  policy is 
also necessary for this result; see, for example, Thomas  J. Sargent  and Neil Wallace, 
"Some Unpleasant Monetarist  Arithmetic," Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 
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The  finding  in  this  paper,  however, isjust the  opposite.  The  experience 
of price inflation  since 1979  has indeed differed  from what would have 
been expected from  the severe double  business recession and  the sharp 
exchange  rate appreciation  on the basis of earlier  correlations,  but that 
difference  has been an even slower deceleration  of prices than conven- 
tional estimates had implied. Each percentage  point of disinflation  has 
therefore been not less but more costly than conventional estimates 
predicted. 
Second, the average negative disturbance  to the growth of money 
supply is presumably  the sign of a more restrictive  monetary  policy- 
though  not in so obvious or straightforward  a way as it may  first  appear. 
Because the sharp  break  in interest  rate  behavior  that  occurred  between 
the third  and  fourth  quarters  of 1979  corresponded  almost  exactly to the 
Federal  Reserve System's announcement  of new monetary  policy op- 
erating  procedures,  it is not surprising  to find  a negative  disturbance  to 
money  supply  standing  out as a key factor  in  the model's  underprediction 
of short-term  interest  rates since then. Indeed, a major  theme in discus- 
sions of the subsequent  high  interest  rates  in the United States has been 
the role of monetary  policy. 
The  most  familiar  argument  along  these lines has  been that  the Federal 
Reserve in October 1979 adopted not just new procedures  but, more 
importantly,  a new anti-inflationary  policy orientation.  According  to this 
view, the subsequent unprecedentedly  high short-term  interest rates 
have simply  reflected  an unprecedentedly  tight  monetary  policy, corre- 
sponding  to substantially  slower growth  of the major  monetary  aggre- 
gates than would otherwise have taken place. An alternative  argument 
with the same conclusion is that the increased interest rate volatility 
brought  about by the Federal  Reserve's new operating  procedures  has 
stimulated  the demand  for money, and hence raised interest  rates for a 
given money supply.  14  Other  variants  are also possible. 
The model employed here is capable of addressing  some aspects of 
this question. The model treats  the money supply  as  jointly determined 
14. It seems more plausible  a priori  to consider  the greater  interest  rate volatility  a 
cause of higher  levels of long-term  interest  rates but not short-term  rates, in that asset 
price  volatility  probably  increases  the demand  not  just for money but also for relatively 
stable-price  assets like  Treasury  bills. For  an argument  that  volatility  raises  both  long-  and 
short-term  interest  rates, see Angelo Mascaro  and  Allan  H. Meltzer,  "Long- and Short- 
Term  Interest  Rates  in  a  Risky  World,"  Journal  of  Monetary  Economics,  vol.  12 
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by the nonbank  public's  demand  for money  balances  and  by the banking 
system's willingness to  supply money balances, represented by an 
equation  that  takes  the  growth  of nonborrowed  reserves  (and  the  discount 
rate)  as given. To the extent that some change  in the Federal  Reserve's 
policy orientation  altered  the quarter-to-quarter  supply  of nonborrowed 
reserves, in principle  the model  should  be able  to incorporate  that  change 
into its forecast of money supply,  and  hence of short-term  interest  rates 
and other variables. If nothing had changed except the behavior of 
reserves (and if the model's equations  were sufficiently  accurate),  the 
model should not have overpredicted  the nominal  money supply, and 
hence underpredicted  short-term  interest  rates, as shown in table 2. 
The results presented  above therefore  suggest that the source of the 
high  short-term  interest  rate  levels prevailing  since October  1979  has not 
been so simple as a change in monetary  policy that can be adequately 
summarized  by the movement  of nonborrowed  reserves. Instead, over 
a time horizon  as long as fifteen calendar  quarters  the Federal  Reserve 
presumably  adapts  its provision  of reserves  to take  account  of the growth 
of the money stock in  relation  to the corresponding  money  growth  target, 
so that  the actual  monetary  policy variable  over this period  would more 
plausibly  be the money supply itself rather  than the supply of nonbor- 
rowed reserves as in the model. As the decomposition  in table 2 shows, 
if the dynamic  simulation  of the model  had  taken  the actual  values of the 
nominal  money supply  for 1979:4-1983:2  as given  instead  of determining 
them endogenously in the simulation, the resulting forecast of the 
Treasury  bill rate would have been 2.69 percentage  points higher on 
average during  the period.  15 To the extent that growth of the money 
stock itself was the Federal  Reserve's monetary  policy variable  during 
this  period,  the results  suggest  that  tighter  monetary  policy-in  the sense 
of a slower monetary growth than would have been consistent with 
15. Because of the use of simultaneous  equations  methods  to estimate the model, 
simulating  the model  with a variable  modeled  as endogenous  but  taken  as exogenous  for 
purposes  of the simulation  is in general  not  the same  as treating  that  variable  as exogenous 
from  the outset. An alternative  approach  to addressing  the issues raised  here  in  connection 
with monetary  policy would be to introduce  a "monetary  policy reaction  function"  to 
explain  the  growth  of the money  supply  in  terms  of macroeconomic  variables,  like  inflation 
and  the growth  of real  output,  which  the Federal  Reserve  presumably  takes into account 
in choosing  its money  growth  targets.  In the context  of a model  constrained  to be so small 
and simple  as the one used here, however, it would  be difficult  to identify  such a money 
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Table  3. Decomposition  of Long-Term  Interest  Rate Forecast  Errors, 1976:3-1983:2a 
Percent 
Error  and  Mean,  Mean, 
decomposition  1976:3-1979:3  1979:4-1983:2 
Forecast  9.77  10.32 
Actual  9.51  14.81 
Error  source  0.26  -4.49 
Aggregate  demand  0.00  0.12 
Aggregate  supply  -0.36  - 0.92 
Money demand  0.36  0.12 
Money supply  0.38  -0.92 
Term structure  -0.12  - 2.89 
Source:  Authors'  calculations. 
a.  Totals  may not add because  of rounding. 
previous  experience,  given  the  prevailing  conditions-raised the average 
short-term  interest  rate almost  3 percentage  points higher  after  October 
1979. 
Two factors, then, sluggish  deceleration  of price inflation  and slow 
growth of the nominal  money supply, contributed  greatly to the high 
level of short-term  interest  rates during  1979:4-1983:2  in ways that the 
model did not predict. At the same time, the shift in the yield-spread 
relation,  which  failed  to predict  the high  level of long-term  interest  rates, 
contributed  more than 5 percentage  points on average in the opposite 
direction.  16 
This quantitatively  important  impact  of the yield-spread  disturbance 
in mitigating  the model's underprediction  of short-term  interest rates 
during  1979:4-1983:2  is not surprising  in light  of the well-known  inade- 
quacy of the single-equation  unrestricted  reduced-form  approach to 
modeling the term structure of interest rates.17  Table 3 presents a 
summary  of the respective forecasts of the bond rate generated  by the 
1976:3-1979:3 and 1979:4-1983:2 dynamic simulations  of the model, 
together  with the associated error  decompositions,  in a form  analogous 
16. In  addition,  as table  2 shows, the change  in  the mean  aggregate  demand  disturbance 
offset another  0.66 percentage  point. The change  in the mean  money  demand  disturbance 
was negligible. 
17. See, for example, Benjamin  M. Friedman,  "The Determination  of Long-Term 
Interest  Rates:  Implications  for Fiscal and  Monetary  Policies,"  Journal  of Money,  Credit 
andBanking,  vol. 12  (May  1980),  pp. 331-52;  and  Friedman  and  V. Vance  Roley, "Models 
of Long-Term Interest  Rate Determination,"  Journal of Portfolio  Management,  vol.  6 
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to those shown for the Treasury  bill rate in table 2. For all practical 
purposes the model misses entirely the more than 5 percentage  points 
average  rise in the bond rate between these two periods. This failure  is 
more  striking  because the model, as previously  noted, does successfully 
predict  3.80 points of the corresponding  4.82 points average  increase  in 
the bill rate, while the bill rate is the only other jointly determined 
variable  included  in the model's simple  term-structure  equation.18  This 
failure  is not due to the especially compact  form of this model's term- 
structure  equation, with its use of a rational  distributed  lag to capture 
the  relation  between  long-  and  short-term  rates.  Other  researchers,  using 
more  elaborate  and  carefully  constructed  term-structure  equations,  have 
reported  essentially equivalent  results  for this period.  '9 
This failure  of the model's term-structure  equation  (a "disturbance" 
to that equation, in terms of the formal  analysis) caused the model to 
predict higher short-term  interest rate levels in 1979:4-1983:2 than it 
would have forecast on the basis of an accurate  prediction  of long-term 
rates. Underpredicting  the bond rate leads, by way of the aggregate 
demand equation, to overpredicting  real economic growth. Overpre- 
dicting  real growth leads, in turn, via the money demand  equation, to 
overpredicting  the growth  of demand  for real  balances  at any  given level 
of the bill rate. Overpredicting  real growth also leads, by way of the 
aggregate  supply equation,  to overpredicting  price inflation,  and hence 
to underpredicting  the growth  of the supply  of real  balances  for a given 
growth of the nominal  money supply. Overpredicting  the demand  for 
real balances while underpredicting  the corresponding  supply  leads, of 
course, to overpredicting  the bill rate. As the decomposition  in table 2 
shows, if the dynamic simulation  of the model had taken the actual 
18. Because they lower the short-term  interest rate prediction,  both the aggregate 
supply  disturbance  and  the  money  supply  disturbance  do contributejust  under  1  percentage 
point  each  on average  toward  underprediction  of the long-term  rate  during  1979:4-1983:2. 
The nearly  accurate  prediction  of the Treasury  bill rate makes  the large  underprediction 
of the bond rate all the more  surprising  here in that, because of the model's logarithmic 
specification,  the intercept  is in effect a multiplicative  term  premium. 
19. See, for  example,  Robert  J. Shiller,  John  Y. Campbell,  and  Kermit  L. Schoenholtz, 
"Forward  Rates and Future  Policy: Interpreting  the Term  Structure  of Interest  Rates," 
BPEA, 1:1  983, 173-217.  The results  they report  in table  2 of that  paper  for their  standard 
equation  closely resemble  those summarized  in table  3 here. In  general,  any  change  either 
in the time-series  properties  of the short-term  rate or in the determinants  of risk  or term 
premiums  will  change  the behavior  of the long-term  rate  in comparison  with  that  predicted 
by a historically  estimated  term-structure  equation. Richard H.  Clarida and Benjamin M. Friedman  571 
1979:4-1983:2  values of the long-term  interest  rate as given instead of 
determining  them  endogenously,  the resulting  forecast  of the short-term 
interest  rate would have been 5.17 points lower on average  during  this 
period.20 
In sum, the model's relatively  successful  prediction  of the increase  in 
the average level of short-term  interest rates after October 1979  is, in 
large  part, a case of being right  for the wrong reason. Disturbances  in 
three  of the model's  five equations  were, on average,  large  but  offsetting. 
Disturbances  to price setting  and  to money supply  growth  both contrib- 
uted  to making  short-term  interest  rates  higher  than  historical  experience 
would have suggested, and hence both contributed  toward underpre- 
dicting short-term  rates. A disturbance  to the yield-spread  relation- 
that  is, a failure  of the model's term-structure  equation-had the reverse 
effect, resulting  in a fairly  accurate  forecast  overall. 
Real Interest Rates and Aggregate Demand 
One  potentially  worrisome  drawback  of this analysis  is that  the model 
used to generate the forecasts of short-term  interest rates reported  in 
table 1 does not explicitly include  real interest  rates as a determinant  of 
aggregate  demand.  Instead, as equation 1 shows, the model's aggregate 
demand  equation  relates  real  spending  to a nominal  interest  rate,  thereby 
implicitly  admitting  some combination  of real and nominal  rate effects 
without  explicitly  distinguishing  either.  It is possible, therefore,  that  the 
model's underprediction  of short-term  interest  rates after  October 1979 
is somehow due to the omission of an explicit  real interest  rate  from  the 
aggregate  demand  equation. It turns out, however, that this is not the 
case. 
Table  4 presents  an alternative  short-term  interest  rate  forecast  based 
on a five-equation  version  of the model  that  differs  from  the original  used 
above because it includes a distributed  lag of ex post real short-term 
interest  rates as a determinant  of real spending  and therefore  excludes 
the original  model's term-structure  equation. The ex post real short- 
term rate is simply the nominal short-term  rate minus the annualized 
percentage change in the GNP price deflator. Although a long-term 
interest  rate  would  be more  plausible  on a priori  grounds,  the correspon- 
20. The first  point  made  in note 15  is relevant  here  also. 572  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
Table 4.  Short-term Interest Rate Forecasts and Forecast Errors, Alternative Model, 
1979:4-1983:2 
Percent 
Nominal rate  Real rate 
Quarter  Forecast  Actual  Error  Forecast  Actual  Error 
1979:4  10.83  11.80  -0.97  2.28  4.77  -  2.48 
1980:1  11.45  13.46  -2.01  2.38  4.31  -  1.93 
2  10.97  10.05  0.92  1.79  -0.33  2.12 
3  9.11  9.24  -0.13  0.34  0.76  -0.42 
4  9.79  13.71  -3.92  1.74  3.00  -  1.26 
1981:1  9.34  14.37  -5.02  1.99  4.34  -2.35 
2  9.46  14.83  -  5.37  2.50  9.12  -  6.62 
3  9.00  15.09  -  6.09  2.75  6.09  -  3.34 
4  8.14  12.02  -  3.88  2.96  3.42  -  0.47 
1982:1  8.36  12.90  -  4.54  3.44  8.66  -  5.22 
2  7.74  12.36  -4.62  3.48  6.91  -  3.43 
3  6.67  9.71  -  3.03  3.17  6.07  -  2.90 
4  6.00  7.94  -  1.94  1.69  4.16  -2.48 
1983:1  6.12  8.08  -  1.96  2.05  2.73  -0.68 
2  6.04  8.42  -  2.38  2.92  4.99  -  2.08 
Mean  8.60  11.60  - 3.00  2.36  4.60  - 2.24 
Source: Text  equations  la,  2-4,  6, estimated  over  1961:1-1979:3. 
dence between any measurable  ex post real  rate  and  the relevant  ex ante 
rate  would be highly  problematical  for a long-term  rate. 
The aggregate  demand  equation  in this alternative  model, estimated 
as before but with 1961:1-1979:3  data, is 
(la)  AXt =  0.0056  +  0.0003it_-  -  0.0004i,-2 
(3.8)  (0.4)  (-  0.5) 
+  0.0010it-3  -  0.00104it4  +  0.4917AXt-1 
(1.2)  (-  1.4)  (5.4) 
+  0.0974/\E, -  0.0996 Mt 
(1.8)  (-  3.0) 
R2  = 0.43, standard  error  = 0.00835,  rho =  -0.3, 
where it is the ex post real Treasury  bill rate (rst -  4 APt), and the 
numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics.  The use of a distributed  lag of ex 
post real-rate values follows the finding in the empirical investment 
literature  that changes in the service price of capital, of which the real 
interest rate is  a major component, have their major influence on Richard H.  Clarida and Benjamin M. Friedman  573 
investment spending only after several quarters.2"  Nevertheless, the 
estimated  semielasticity  of real spending  growth  for the real Treasury 
bill  rate  is small  during  1961:1-1979:3.  In  particular,  the equation  implies 
that an increase of  1 percentage point in the real Treasury bill rate 
reduces  the growth  of real spending  by only one-tenth  of 1  percent.22 
Table 4 shows the resulting  performance  of the five-equation  model 
in forecasting both nominal and real short-term  interest rates during 
1979:4-1983:2. Like the forecasts reported  in table 1, these are based 
on a dynamic  simulation  in which, after  the initial  quarter,  the forecast 
of each  variable  relies  on the model's  forecast  of all  endogenous  variables 
in the previous  period. 
The results shown in table 4 for nominal short-term  interest rates 
differ  from  those shown in table 1 in the expected way, given the role of 
the yield-spread  disturbance  discussed above. The five-equation  model 
underpredicts  the nominal  rate  in all quarters  except 1980:2,  with  a mean 
error  of - 3.00 percentage  points for the entire fifteen-quarter  forecast 
period.  In the absence of the distortion  due to the original  model's term- 
structure  equation, therefore, the underprediction  by the five-equation 
model  of short-term  nominal  interest  rates  is about  2/4 percentage  points 
greater  than  that of the original  model. 
The five-equation  model also underpredicts  ex post real short-term 
interest  rates, with a mean  error  of - 2.24 percentage  points. Here again 
the results  differ  from  those generated  by the original  six-equation  model 
in the expected way, given the deletion of the term-structure  equation. 
Although  no real interest  rate  explicitly  appears  in the original  model, it 
is straightforward  to calculate that model's forecast of the ex post real 
short-term  interest rate from the corresponding  nominal  rate and price 
inflation forecasts. Doing so  indicates that the six-equation model 
underpredicts  the ex post real  short-term  rate  during  1979:4-1983:2,  but 
with  mean  error  of only - 0.03 percentage  point  (again  due to some large 
21. See for example,  Peter  K. Clark,  "Investment  in the 1970s:  Theory,  Performance, 
and  Prediction,"  BPEA, 1:1979,  pp. 73-113. 
22. Mishkin has also documented  the difficulty  in finding significant  correlations 
between  the ex post real  bill rate  and real  income  growth.  He pointed  out the difficulty  in 
discerning  the movement  between real variables  and real interest rates in a sample in 
which  there  was so little  variation  in real  rates;  see Frederic  S. Mishkin,  "The  Real  Interest 
Rate:  An Empirical  Investigation,"  in Karl  Brunner  and  Allan  H. Meltzer,  eds., The  Costs 
and Consequences  of Inflation,  Carnegie-Rochester  Conference  Series  on Public  Policy, 
vol. 15  (Amsterdam:  North-Holland,  1981),  pp. 151-200. 574  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
offsetting  errors).  In  the absence  of the term-structure  equation,  the five- 
equation  model  again  shows an underprediction  about  2  l/4points  greater 
than  that  of the original  model. 
Overall, this correspondence  between the respective results of the 
six-equation  model  and  the alternative  five-equation  model  suggests  that 
the conclusion  that short-term  interest  rates  have been "too high" since 
October  1979  does not hinge  in any  important  way on the use of a nominal 
interest  rate  in  the aggregate  demand  equation  of the original  six-equation 
model. 
A Caveat on Structural Change 
The analysis summarized  in table 2 decomposes the errors  made in 
forecasting  short-term  interest  rates after 1976:2  or 1979:3  into compo- 
nents attributed  to the additive disturbance  terms in the underlying 
model's structural  equations.  As the discussion  at the outset has already 
noted, this analysis is conditional on the invariance of the model's 
parameters  to any changes in the relevant  economic environment  that 
may have occurred  after 1976:2  or 1979:3, respectively. Especially in 
the context of the change in the Federal Reserve System's monetary 
policy procedures  (and perhaps  also its policy orientation)  announced 
at the beginning  of October 1979, this invariance  assumption  merits 
closer inspection. 
If a structural  break did occur in October 1979, it would not be 
appropriate  to use the model's historically estimated parameters  to 
recover  from  the model's  forecast  errors  the disturbances  corresponding 
to each equation.  Nevertheless, even in the presence of such a break,  it 
is still  possible-and  potentially  valuable-to compare  the recent  behav- 
ior of short-term  interest  rates  to the forecast  implied  by the historically 
estimated model. Such a comparison  can still determine  whether the 
behavior  of short-term  rates has been unusual  in light of the historical 
correlations  among key macroeconomic  aggregates  as summarized  by 
the model. 
As is clear in table 1, the model's post-1979:3 errors in predicting 
short-term  interest rates differ in both sign and magnitude  from their 
post-1976:2  equivalents. An alternative  interpretation  of this result to 
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Table  5. F-Statistics  for Tests  of Changes  in Parameters,  Selected  Periods 
Break  at 
Break  at  Break  at  1979:3 
Equation  1976:2  1979:3  (slopes only) 
Aggregate  demand  1.17  5.14*  3.78* 
Aggregate  supply  1.28  2.46*  1.99** 
Money demand  0.26  6.89*  3.24* 
Money supply  1.11  8.53*  7.92* 
Term  structure  0.37  3.87*  3.53* 
Source:  Authors'  calculations. 
* Significant  at 1 percent  level. 
** Significant  at 5 percent  level. 
estimated behavioral equations, not just  additive distrubances, ac- 
counted  for this sharp  difference.  Whether  or not the parameters  of the 
model  are invariant  to changes in the behavior  of monetary  policy-or, 
for that matter,  to any other change-is  an empirical  issue. In contrast 
to the absence of any evidence of a break after 1976:2 as discussed 
above, the results of Chow tests reported  in table 5 indicate  statistically 
significant  evidence of a break  after 1979:3  for each of the five estimated 
equations.  Moreover,  as that  table  also shows, the results  of Chow tests 
for  stability  of the slope  parameters  (that  is, a Chow  test for  each  equation 
including  an intercept shift after 1979:3)  also indicate  a break  for each 
of the five equations. 
These findings  reinforce  the impression,  given in a more  specific  way 
by the post-  1979:3  underprediction  of short-term  interest  rates, that  the 
relevant  correlations  among  major  macroeconomic  quantities  and  prices 
in fact did not remain  invariant  to the October 1979  shift in monetary 
policy regime.23  This result is  not surprising on a priori grounds. 
Expectations  of future  monetary  policy behavior  are  presumably  impor- 
tant determinants  of macroeconomic  behavior, yet the simple specifi- 
cations in the model used here omit such expectational effects. The 
aggregate  supply  and  term-structure  relations  are  obvious  examples,  but 
the other equations may be affected as well. For example, changes in 
monetary  policy behavior  such as the changes in operating  procedures 
implemented  in October  1979  in general  change  the variance-covariance 
structure  of asset returns,  and changes in stochastic asset-return  struc- 
23. As Sims has pointed  out in a different  context, however, it remains  difficult  to 
distinguish  a "structural"  break  from the effect of outlier  residuals;  see Christopher  A. 
Sims, "Macroeconomics  and  Reality,"  Econometrica,  vol. 48 (January  1980),  pp. 1-48. 576  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
tures presumably  affect the portfolio  behavior  that underlies  the deter- 
mination  of both short- and long-term  interest rates.24  Moreover, this 
problem  is hardly  a feature  associated  only with simple  models  like this 
one. More sophisticated  rational  expectations  econometric  models are 
also not invariant  to changes like those that alter  asset return  variance- 
covariance  structures.25 
Even so, it is important  to recall that the shift in aggregate  supply 
behavior  since October  1979  reported  here  was in the opposite  direction 
of that  implied  by familiar  claims  about  the effects of announced  changes 
in monetary  policy. What was surprising  about the course of prices in 
1979:4-1983:2  was how slowly, not how rapidly,  they decelerated. 
In  sum,  the  problem  of changing  slope  parameters  is at  least  potentially 
important  here. Its implication  is certainly  to warrant  caution, perhaps 
even a healthy skepticism, in accepting  the results of the error  decom- 
positions presented  above. The more  basic finding  remains  in any case: 
since October 1979,  short-term  interest  rates have been high  in compar- 
ison with the implications  of previous  historical  correlations. 
Conclusions 
Two questions motivated  the analysis in this paper:  (1) Have short- 
term  interest  rates  in the United States  recently  been "too high"  in some 
meaningful  sense? (2) If so, why? 
The paper's answer to the first question is yes. Given the relevant 
historical  relations  among interest rates and other key aspects of mac- 
roeconomic activity, U.S. short-term  interest  rates since October 1979 
have been higher  than would have been predicted.  Moreover,  although 
the specific model used to summarize  those historical  relations  imposes 
24. For  evidence  that  the  greater  interest  rate  volatility  resultingfrom  the  new  operating 
procedures  changed  borrowing  behavior  in a way that  could  account  for  the breakdown  of 
the term-structure  equation discussed above, see Benjamin  M. Friedman, "Federal 
Reserve Policy, Interest Rate Volatility, and the U.S.  Capital  Raising Mechanism," 
Journal  of Money,  Credit and Banking,  vol.  14 (November  1982), pp. 721-45.  For an 
argument  that this greater  interest  rate  volatility  changed  the interest  elasticity  of money 
demand  see Carl  E. Walsh, "The Demand  for Money  under  Uncertainty  and  the Role of 
Monetary  Policy" (Princeton  University,  1981). 
25. See, for example,  John  B. Taylor, "Estimation  and Control  of a Macroeconomic 
Model  with Rational  Expectations,"  Econometrica,  vol. 47 (September  1979),  pp. 1267- 
86; and Olivier Jean Blanchard,  "The Monetary  Mechanism  in the Light of Rational 
Expectations,"  in  Stanley  Fischer,  ed.,  Rational  Expectations  and  Economic  Policy 
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strong  restrictions,  there is reason  to believe that  this result  is robust  to 
the presence or absence of those restrictions.  Other  attempts  to address 
this question with much weaker restrictions  on the relevant historical 
correlations  give much  the same answer.26 
The paper's answer to the second question  is a specific rendering  of 
the basic story of high  demand  for real money balances  interacting  with 
low supply. In the period since October 1979,  price inflation  was faster 
and nominal  money growth slower than would have been expected on 
the basis of previous historical experience, given the values of real 
output, the terms of trade, and other relevant variables describing 
macroeconomic  conditions. One phenomenon  reflected  the behavior  of 
the economy's private sector; the other, monetary  policy.27  The inter- 
action of the two would be expected to raise the level of short-term 
interest  rates, not  just in this model  but in any familiar  representation  of 
interest  rate  determination.  The analysis  suggests  that  it did  so by a large 
amount. 
APPENDIX 
Extended-Sample  Equations 
of the Pirandello  Model 
THE  following  equations  are for the 1961:1-1979:3  sample  period.28 
Aggregate  demand: 
(1')  AX, =  0.0064  -  0.1026 ArLt  +  0.1024AEt 
(4.8)  (-2.9)  (2.0) 
-  0.0688  AIt  1  +  0.4397  AXt_  1 
(-2.2)  (5.0) 
W2  = 0.49, standard  error  = 0.00780,  rho =  -0.4; 
26. See again  the parallel  analysis  based  on a vector  autoregression  system in Clarida 
and Friedman,  "The Behavior  of U.S. Short-Term  Interest  Rates since October 1979." 
The results of that analysis  are also consistent  with the conclusion, stated immediately 
below, connecting  the high  level of short-term  interest  rates  to the relation  between real 
balances  and  real  economic  activity. 
27. The conclusion  that a change in monetary  policy was a large  factor in bringing 
about the high level of short-term  interest rates implies neither criticism nor praise. 
Evaluating  the  appropriateness  of monetary  policy  during  this  period  lies beyond  the scope 
or intent  of this paper. 
28. See the text and  equations  1  'through  6' for discussion  and  definitions  of symbols. 578  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1983 
Aggregate  supply: 
(2')  AP' =  0.0895 YA  1 +  0.0542 Al-1 I +  0.8700 AP, 
(3.4)  (3.9)  (25.2) 
=2 = 0.88, standard  error  = 0.00347,  rho =  -0.  1; 
Money demand: 
(3')  A(M -  P),  =  0.1192 AX, -  0.0406 Ars, 
(1.9)  (-  3.9) 
+  0.8703 A(M -  P).- 
(7.7) 
R  =  0.53, standard  error  = 0.00676,  rho =  -0.5; 
(4')  AM, =  0.0034  +  0.2118AR2  ,  I +  0.0097Ars, 
(2.3)  (2.1)  (0.6) 
-  0.0234  ArD, +  0.7627  AM, 
(-1.3)  (8.6) 
2=  0.53, standard  error  = 0.00481,  rho =  -0.2; 
Term structure: 
(5')  ArLt =  0.0472  +  0.1441rs,  -  0. 0579rs,,- 
(1.4)  (I. 1)  ( -  0.5) 
+  0.1376 A(L -  S)t_ I +  0.9100 rL,_l 
(2.3)  (37.0) 
W2  = 0.98, standard  error  = 0.020, rho = 0.4; 
Nominal  income identity: 
(6')  A  =  AXY  +  Apt. Comments 
and Discussion 
Jeffrey R. Shafer: Richard  Clarida  and Benjamin  Friedman  examine 
whether short-term  interest rates in the United States have been "too 
high" in the 1980s.  They provide  an affirmative  answer  to this question 
and  proceed  to ask why. Their  explanation  is that  an upward  shift  in the 
demand  for money interacted  with a more restrictive  monetary  policy 
after  October  1979.  The  authors  present  an  interesting  empirical  analysis, 
but overreach in claiming  that it constitutes very strong evidence for 
these conclusions. For one thing, the authors'  claim that interest  rates 
are too high turns out to mean less than it sounds. And their chain of 
argument  leading  from  the empirical  observations  to the conclusion  that 
monetary  policy is a principal  cause of high  interest  rates  has some weak 
links. This is not to say that the conclusion is wrong, only that the 
evidence in the paper  is not apt. 
Few would  quarrel  with  the statement  that  U. S. interest  rates  are  high 
by historical  standards,  whether  one is talking  about  long-term  or short- 
term rates, nominal  or real. Clarida  and Friedman  document  just how 
much higher  rates have been since the fourth  quarter  of 1979  than they 
were earlier. But in addressing  the question  whether  they are too high, 
different  groups  of people are  asking  very different  things.  Policymakers 
are  asking  whether  interest  rates  are  where  they ought  to be given policy 
goals such as output, employment,  inflation,  and capital  formation,  and 
the trade-offs  among  these goals involved  in  adjusting  policy  instruments 
to reduce  interest  rates. Portfolio  managers  are asking  whether  the level 
of rates  will  be sustained  or  will  interest  rates  come down  soon. Analytical 
economists are asking  whether  the level of interest  rates is explainable 
by their  models of how the world  works and  whether  their  models must 
be revised or abandoned. 
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Clarida  and Friedman's work takes mainly the third perspective. 
They seek to interpret  interest rate developments in the context of a 
model that predates  the period of extremely high interest rates. Their 
conclusions, even where  they have the "ring"  of policy statements,  are 
more analytical  conclusions. They do not follow from any systematic 
analysis in the paper  of what policy goals would be achieved by lower 
interest  rates and what the costs might  be. Neither do the conclusions 
imply anything  about the likely future course of interest rates, which 
would  be of interest  to market  participants. 
As a research  methodology  their approach  has more to recommend 
it. Friedman  had set forth a compact model of key macroeconomic 
relations  in 1977.  He or anyone else who found  this model  convincing  at 
that time should be interested  in how the model has performed  out of 
sample-especially  how well it accounts for the higher  interest  rates of 
recent  years. One  appropriate  test is a dynamic  out-of-sample  simulation 
of the model  using  the actual  values of exogenous variables.  The core of 
the Clarida  and  Friedman  paper  is an analysis  of the differences  between 
such a simulation  and  the actual  behavior  of the economy. 
The simulation  accounts  remarkably  well for  the higher  level of short- 
term interest rates from 1979:4  to  1983:2  compared to the previous 
thirteen  quarters.  On the face of it, short-term  interest rates have not 
been unaccountably  high, but the authors  correctly point out that this 
performance  is deceptive. There are sizable errors  in individual  equa- 
tions, which offset one another in their effects on the interest rate 
forecast. But it seems unbalanced  to focus on these errors  to the total 
neglect  of what  exogenous variables  of the model  contribute  to the story. 
The principal  empirical  finding  of the paper  is that  the decomposition 
of interest  rate  forecast  errors  shows that  what  the authors  call  aggregate 
supply  and money supply  equations  contributed  to a large  underpredic- 
tion of interest rates. These errors  were largely offset by errors  in the 
opposite  direction  in the term-structure  equation.  This  is useful  diagnos- 
tic  information for someone who wishes to  work with the earlier 
Friedman  model. It suggests that these equations  are most crucially  in 
need of  revision to  provide structural stability if one  is  primarily 
concerned  about  how well the model  explains  interest  rates. Otherwise, 
on a priori  grounds  and on the basis of reported  test statistics, I would 
have enough concern about the specification  of other equations  that I 
would not know where to begin. Particularly  disconcerting  features of Richard H.  Clarida and Benjamin M. Friedman  581 
other  parts  of the model include  indiscriminate  logarithmic  transforma- 
tion of interest  rates, the choice of a fiscal variable,  and the use of the 
long-term nominal interest rate in the aggregate demand equation. 
Interestingly,  Clarida  and  Friedman  felt uncomfortable  enough  with  the 
last feature to make a half-hearted  attempt  to find alternatives,  while 
letting  stand  the equations  that  the variance  decomposition  identified  as 
more  troublesome. 
The authors  claim that their error  decomposition  procedure  can be 
used for more than just diagnosis. They attempt to draw extensive 
insights  from the pattern  of errors. I think one should be skeptical of 
their  further  claims. Let me mention  several  of my reservations. 
First, the reported  Chow tests reject  structural  stability  of the slopes 
for all equations after 1979:3. The authors argue that this does not 
invalidate the conclusion that interest rates are high by  historical 
standards.  But they would have the reader  take more  than  this from  the 
paper. The estimated slope coefficients are at the heart of the error- 
decomposition  exercise. It is going too far to claim that the results are 
more  than  indicative  for diagnosing  how the model has gone off track. 
The apparent  instability  of the slope parameters  also undermines  the 
intuition  that  the authors  seek to attach  to their  results.  What  they would 
have the reader do is interpret  the error  terms in the money and the 
aggregate supply equations as the effects of unobserved exogenous 
developments in the recent period. Implicitly they would have us 
attribute  the errors in the term-structure  equation  to misspecification 
and  hence view them as statistical  artifacts  to be set aside. There  are no 
grounds  for treating  the different  errors  differently. 
Second, even if one had confidence  in the error  decomposition,  one 
could not extract much information  about why the errors occurred. 
What  is not known is whether the reason for large errors  in the term- 
structure  equation  is a risk  premium  in long-term  interest  rates, whether 
it is because long-run  inflationary  expectations remain high, whether 
structural  government deficits and investment incentives have raised 
the long-term  real interest rate consistent with high employment  and 
output, or whether there is some other reason. The model might  have 
had something  more to say on the deficit issue if it had included  high- 
employment  tax receipts, as well as government  expenditures, as an 
exogenous variable. 
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supply errors have been important  to the conclusion that monetary 
policy has been more  restrictive.  It is clear  that  the authors  were fishing 
for this result from their choice of 1979:4  to begin the second out-of- 
sample simulation.  This break corresponds  closely to the October 6, 
1979, announcement  of a more determined  anti-inflationary  monetary 
policy by the Federal  Reserve. There  are  good grounds  for  believing  that 
this policy change is an important  reason why short-term  interest  rates 
have  been so high  if one accepts  the existence  of considerable  momentum 
in wage-price  dynamics  and inflationary  expectations. But the timing  of 
the errors  in the simulation  does not fit  this explanation  so neatly. Table 
2 of the paper  shows that a shift  from  overprediction  to underprediction 
of the short-term  interest  rate  occurred  earlier  and  that  very large  errors 
emerged  only a year later. 
Moreover, in the context of the model, errors  in the money supply 
equation  ought  not be interpreted  as policy changes. The money supply 
function treats the Federal Reserve policy instruments-the supply of 
nonborrowed  reserves  and  the discount  rate-as  exogenous. The  behav- 
ior of these exogenous variables  ought to capture  policy changes. The 
function  embodies two behavioral  elements  that are not closely related 
to the stance of policy. One element is the multiplier  relation  between 
total required  reserves and  M i-a  convolution  of required  reserves, the 
composition  of reservable  deposits included  in and excluded from Ml, 
and the relative demand for currency. The other element is banks' 
demand  for net free reserves-excess  reserves less discount-window 
borrowing.  Changes  in the multiplier  relation  between  required  reserves 
and  M  I are  taken  into account  routinely  in open market  operations.  The 
behavior of free reserves is relatively unimportant  over a period of 
several years. Therefore, persistent errors in the estimated relation 
simply  are not a measure  of a monetary  policy shift. 
How then might  one explain the money supply errors?  Many  things 
were happening  that caused the relation  between reserves and M1 to 
change.  During  the 1970s  the reserve  base  was eroding  as banks  withdrew 
from membership  in the Federal  Reserve System and demand  deposits 
declined relative to  currency. The Monetary Control Act and the 
International  Banking  Act led to the phased-in  application  of reserve 
requirements  to a much wider set of institutions  beginning  in late 1980 
but with a phasing down of reserve requirements  on member  banks. 
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fallen at a slower rate after 1979.  This structural  change, coming soon 
after  the beginning  date for the simulation,  could account  for the errors 
in the money supply  equation.  The coefficients  in the equation  may also 
be biased  by common  trends  in  the left-hand-side  variables,  which  would 
pick up the secular erosion of the reserve base. Overprediction  in the 
postsample period would be the result. Whatever  the explanation  for 
this overprediction, it cannot, by itself, be taken to reflect monetary 
policy. 
A final, more  general  concern  about  the interpretations  suggested  for 
the error  decomposition  is that it presumes  that the respective errors  in 
the various equations  are independent  of one another.  There  is nothing 
in the nature  of structural  disturbances  that requires  them to be inde- 
pendent. Indeed, in many circumstances  the nature of a model may 
impose systematic relations  among  structural  disturbances.  For exam- 
ple, in a demand  system an increase  in the error  term  in the demand  for 
one good must  be offset by reduced  demands  for other  goods, or budget 
constraints  will not be satisfied. In the present context one can invent 
reasons why the disturbances  in different  equations might  be related. 
Taking  the authors'  interpretation  for the sake of illustration,  unusually 
strong  exogenous inflationary  pressures  could  well induce  money  supply 
policies that are more restrictive  than normal.  One would then want to 
call the apparent  aggregate-supply  and money-supply  disturbances  in- 
dependent  causes of high  interest  rates. 
There  are  many  more  reasons  than  I have  discussed  to take  the Clarida 
and Friedman  results  lightly. Few are likely to find  the model satisfying 
and  therefore  would not want  to take its pathologies  seriously. 
Although I have serious reservations about the authors' specific 
exercise, I believe there is considerable  value in their  general  approach 
of analyzing  macroeconomic  issues using a small empirical  model and 
attempting  to interpret  its forecasting  errors  using information  on vari- 
ables and developments  that are omitted  from the model. In the policy 
community  and the financial  community,  people tend to look at many 
more  things  than  are  included  in  the authors'  model. But  without  a model 
framework,  they tend to do so in partial  and often inconsistent  ways. A 
small, closed model is a useful tool to foster consistent general  equilib- 
rium thinking in these  circles. The big models are simply beyond 
comprehension.  A small model will always have difficulty  with forces 
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inevitably becomes one of identifying and interpreting  error terms 
structurally.  But the analysis of errors needs to be done with close 
attention  to what is going on at a microeconomic  level, and a priori 
calculations  of what shift might  be attributable  to observable  develop- 
ments,  such  as changes  in  reserve  requirement  regulations,  are  indispens- 
able to such analysis. The small model user cannot abstract  from the 
complexity  of the world, even though  the model  does. 
General  Discussion 
Several participants  discussed the large underpredictions  of long- 
term interest rates which, as Benjamin  Friedman  and Richard  Clarida 
stress, were inadequately modeled by the term-structure  equation. 
Stanley Fischer reasoned that the high long-term  rates were possibly 
due to high expected inflation  rates, and that inflationary  expectations 
should  be modeled explicitly in order  to test for this. William  Branson 
observed  that  the rise in the dollar  exchange  rate showed that  long-term 
rates were not high because expected inflation  was correspondingly 
high-a  situation  that  should  depreciate,  or not affect, the exchange  rate 
currently, and should depreciate it through  time-but  rather  the rise 
represented  high  current  and expected real rates of interest. In turn  the 
high real interest rates are caused by the anticipated  structural  budget 
deficits that will require  both investment and the trade balance to be 
squeezed. James  Tobin  replied  that  deficits  did not provide  an adequate 
explanation  because the large rise in long-term  rates and the biggest 
underpredictions  from historical  term-structure  equations occurred in 
the months immediately  following  the October 1979  change in Federal 
Reserve policy. This was long before anyone could foresee the large 
budget  deficits  that  resulted  from  President  Reagan's  1981  fiscal  changes. 
Edward  Bernstein  suggested  that financial  deregulation  contributed 
to raising  the level of interest  rates  and  producing  the kind  of prediction 
errors observed by the authors. Before March 1980  the interest rates 
that commercial  banks and thrift  institutions  paid on time and savings 
deposits, except large CDs, were subject  to ceilings established  by the 
Federal  Reserve  and  other  regulatory  agencies.  Whenever  money  market 
rates  rose above  these ceilings,  these institutions  were  unable  to compete 
freely for loanable  funds. As a result, Bernstein  argued,  the demand  for 
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thrift  institutions  could not fully affect market  rates of interest. With 
deregulation,  commercial banks and thrift institutions can now pay 
interest  on checkable  deposits  and  can  bid  freely  in  the market  to acquire 
loanable  funds. As a consequence,  the interest  rates  at which  the supply 
of and  demand  for  credit  are  equated  under  given  monetary  and  economic 
conditions  are higher  now than they would have been under  previous 
regulations. 
Robert J. Gordon suggested that financial  deregulation  could help 
explain the collapse in velocity during 1982. That collapse must have 
contributed  to errors  in the Friedman-Clarida  equations  and  should  help 
explain  the high  level of short-term  interest  rates actually  experienced. 
Gordon  argued  that if the equations  had properly  specified  the demand 
for money as depending  on the difference  between the interest rate on 
money and on other  assets rather  than  just on the level of some interest 
rate, the equations  would have better captured  the effects of financial 
deregulation  and  performed  more  accurately. 
Christopher  Sims questioned the methodology of the Friedman- 
Clarida  model and  the interpretation  of its results. First, he noted that  it 
was inappropriate  to treat variables  such as the discount  rate as exoge- 
nous when, in fact, the discount rate appeared  to follow market  rates. 
With  a reduced  form impact  coefficient of about 0.5, the movement in 
the discount  rate  would  account  for  a substantial  part  of the mean  change 
in short-term rates between the two periods analyzed, even  if its 
estimated  effect eventually became much smaller. Its minor  impact in 
the reduced form for the long-term  rate might help explain why the 
change  in long  rates  was forecast  so much  worse than  the change  in short 
rates. Second, he noted that many variables, such as those that might 
capture changing expectations, were omitted from the model. Sims 
concluded that, both because of such omissions and because the exo- 
geneity  of some variables  was doubtful,  the authors'  structural  interpre- 
tation of the equation errors was unconvincing.  The level of interest 
rates, for example, may not be caused by the factors  that Friedman  and 
Clarida  stressed. 